Fertilizer trade and pricing in Uganda by Omamo, Steven Were
Agrekon, Vol 42, No 4 (December 2003)  Omamo 
 
 








Liberalized fertilizer markets in eastern Africa typically deliver fertilizer to 
smallholder farming regions at prices that render its use unprofitable. 
Simultaneously, faced with little demand for fertilizer in these regions, fertilizer 
traders appear unwilling to invest in measures that might reduce farm-gate prices. A 
basic question throughout the region is therefore how to cost-effectively increase 
smallholders’ access to fertilizer, under conditions of liberalized and privatised trade 
in the input. This paper explores that question for Uganda using data from a wide-
ranging study of Uganda’s fertilizer sub-sector. The prevailing system of fertilizer 
procurement and distribution is found to imply a market structure dominated by 
retail-level trade, high prices, and low net margins. The study concludes that there is 
no inherent pressures in the extant system of fertilizer procurement and distribution 
toward development of a wholesaling backbone that might allow capture of scale 
economies. But with imaginative and sustained investments in institutional 
innovation and strengthening, there is scope to reduce prices and increase net trading 
margins. 
 
1. FERTILIZER  TRADE  AND PRICING IN UGANDA 
 
Soil nutrient depletion is widespread on small farms in eastern Africa (De 
Jager et al, 1998; KARI, 1998; Pender et al, 2001; Sanchez et al, 1997; World 
Bank, 2001). Improved management of soil organic matter is well recognized 
as crucial to soil fertility replenishment in the region (Woomer & Swift, 1994). 
Greater use of inorganic fertilizers is also central to realizing the productivity 
and yield increases required to override smallholders’ motives to pursue 
nutrient-depleting subsistence-oriented production strategies (Palm et al, 
1997). But throughout the region, farmers typically apply inorganic fertilizers 
at rates well below recommended levels, or not at all (Tegemeo, 1998; Pender 
et al, 2001). 
 
Low rates of fertilizer adoption and utilization have been linked not only to 
poor knowledge and understanding of fertilizer-based cultural practices 
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among smallholders (Seward & Okello, 2000), but also to systematic exclusion 
of smallholders from fertilizer markets (Tegemeo, 1998). These recently 
liberalized markets typically deliver fertilizer to smallholder farming regions 
at prices that render its use unprofitable (Mose, 1998; Mose et al, 1997; 
Tegemeo, 1998). Simultaneously, faced with little demand for fertilizer in 
smallholder regions, fertilizer traders appear to be unwilling to invest in 
measures that might reduce those farm-gate prices (Omamo & Mose, 2001). 
 
Several efforts are underway in the region to try to override these failures in 
fertilizer markets. Initiatives range from relatively isolated but focused, 
community-oriented initiatives (e.g. Seward & Okello, 2000), to wider-
reaching programs aiming to build stockist networks in smallholder areas 
(e.g. IDEA, 2002; SG-2000, 2002; AT-Uganda, 2001), to centrally coordinated 
national schemes with broad development aims (e.g. World Bank, 2001). A 
basic question facing all of these efforts is how to cost-effectively increase 
smallholders’ access to fertilizer, under conditions of liberalized and 
privatised trade in the input. 
 
This paper explores that question for Uganda using data from a wide-ranging 
study of Uganda’s fertilizer sub-sector. The study was undertaken between 
November 2001 and June of 2002 and comprised informal interviews and a 
structured survey of a range of stakeholders including fertilizer traders, 
transporters, farmers, farmer organizations, NGOs, and government officials. 
Secondary data sources were also exploited. In this paper, qualitative 
information on how fertilizer trading is organized is combined with 
quantitative data on trading costs and price formation to assess prospects for 
market-based reductions in retail fertilizer prices and trading margins. 
 
The next section describes the principal channels used to procure and 
distribute fertilizer in the country. Prices and marketing margins for the major 
traded fertilizers are then analysed. This is followed by a discussion of options 
for reducing prices and increasing marketing margins. Implications for policy 
are drawn. 
 
2. PROCUREMENT  AND DISTRIBUTION 
 
Figure 1 shows the current organization of fertilizer procurement and 
distribution in Uganda. Table 1 shows total imports and import shares of the 
leading firms. 
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Source:  Author’s survey of traders. 
Note:  The principal procurement and distribution channel is shown in bold. 
 
Figure 1:  Principal procurement and distribution channels for fertilizer in 
Uganda in the 2001-2002 cropping year 
 
The key players are importers based in the capital, Kampala, and in Mbale, a 
town near the border with Kenya. These importers procure fertilizer either 
directly from overseas suppliers or from other, larger importers based in 
Nairobi, Kenya. The latter source is the more common of the two. Fertilizer 
availability in Kenya therefore determines that in Uganda; fertilizer prices in 
Uganda are based on those in Kenya. 
 
An important feature of the marketing system is that Uganda’s importers also 
function as wholesalers. The survey of traders did not yield a single 
wholesaling operation outside Kampala and Mbale. Save for two importer-
wholesalers based in Mbale, fertilizer wholesaling is concentrated in Kampala. 
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Large-scale farms typically procure fertilizer directly from overseas, only 
occasionally putting out tenders for supply by domestic firms. The market is 
therefore essentially a retail market. 
 
Table 1:  Estimated import shares of leading firms in Uganda, 2001 
Rank of importer  Quantity imported 
(tons) 




1 4,933  25  25 
2 3,500  18  43 
3 1,814  9  52 
4 908  5  57 
5 500  3  60 
6 390  2  62 
7 350  2  63 
8 175  1  64 
Total of top 8  12,570  64  64 
Total for Uganda  19,564  -  - 
Sources: Uganda Revenue Authority and author’s survey of traders. 
 
The absence of a geographically dispersed wholesaling backbone is the most 
important feature of Uganda’s fertilizer market. Virtually all the fertilizer sold 
outside Kampala and Mbale is sold on a retail basis. Several interviewed 
traders quote “wholesale” prices. But almost invariably, “wholesale” refers to 
a few 50 kg bags. “Retail” refers to fertilizer sold in 5 kg or 1 kg bags. 
 
Given the extreme seasonality in fertilizer sales, fertilizer retail stockists are 
invariably engaged in other retailing activities. Other agricultural inputs, 
various farm implements, and common consumer dry goods are typical 
groupings. Scales of operation are small. In most cases, fertilizer trade occurs in 
one-person outfits sited in small stalls (kiosks) in or near central market places. 
 
A number of NGOs involved in agricultural development have invested in 
building capacity for input supply among stockists and in catalysing demand 
for inputs by smallholders, typically in collaboration with local farmer groups 
and associations. In some cases, the NGOs merely serve to link farmers with 
Kampala and Mbale based importer-distributors, with trade proceeding on a 
commercial basis (e.g. AT-Uganda, 2002; IDEA, 2002; SG-2000, 2002). In other 
cases, the NGOs actually procure fertilizer and distribute it to farmers at a 
subsidized rate (Gasparotti, 2002). In some towns—such as Mbarara and 
Kabale in western Uganda—district branches of the Uganda National Farmers 
Association (UNFA) are active, selling fertilizer at rates that appear to reflect 
major marketing costs. 
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Liberalization of Uganda’s fertilizer market has induced a vigorous response 
from the private sector, implying that broad efficiency gains have accrued to 
the farming sector. However, due in large part to the high cost of entry and 
participation in fertilizer importation, the fertilizer market is imperfectly 
competitive. The level of concentration is high. The eight leading importer-
wholesalers—i.e., those who do not concentrate on the large-farm segment of 
the market—jointly account for 12,500 tons of fertilizer imports, almost two-
thirds of the entire market of 19,500 tons.2 Their actual share of domestically 
traded fertilizer is much larger, since direct imports of fertilizer by large-scale 
farms account for most of the remaining 7,000 tons. For instance, one large tea 
estate in western Uganda imported 1,845 tons in 2001; one firm that 
concentrates on large-scale flower producers accounted for 800 tons in that 
year. The leading importer accounts for fully one-quarter of the market. The 
top four firms—all Kampala-based—account for almost 60% of the market. 
 
3.  PRICES AND MARGINS 
 
Fertilizer prices in Uganda have fallen significantly in recent years.3 But they 
remain high. In late May 2002, the wholesale price of one tons of 
diammonium phosphate (DAP) in Kampala was $325. In comparison, the 
price in Nairobi was $265/ton. The fob price in Tampa, US was $165. 
 
Given that retail sales dominate fertilizer trade in Uganda (Figure 1), the 
remainder of this section focuses on retail prices and margins. 
 
Within Uganda, retail prices rise steadily from Mbale in the east to towns like 
Mbarara and Kabale in the west (Table 2). At the time of the trader survey 
(May-June, 2002), retail margins ranged from 5% (in Bukedea) to 28% (in 
Kabale). These margins were generally lower than were those reported for 
2000 (IFDC, 2001). The reason for this decline is not fully clear. One cause 
might be increased competition as more firms enter a market that is growing 
slowly, if at all.4 
 
To build understanding of the nature of that market, consider prices and 
margins in the three towns of Bukedea, Iganga and Kabale. 
 
                                                 
2 At 19,500 tons, the size of Uganda’s market (i.e., excluding the large farm sector) in 2001 
appears to be equivalent to its size in 2000 (IFDC, 2001). 
3 Urea and diammonium phosphate (DAP) prices fell from between US$26.25 and US$31.25 
per 50 kg bag, respectively, in late 1998 to US$16.70 and US$$20.55 per 50 kg bag, 
respectively, in December 2000. 
4 Cf. footnote 1. 
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Table 2:  Retail  prices  and gross retail margins for major fertilizers in 
selected locations in Uganda, May-June 2002 

























Eastern           
  Mbale*  670  10  520  12  570  11 
  Kapchorwa**  740  8  580  7  600  10 
  Bukedea**  800  5  -  -  -  - 
  Iganga*  750  18  725  10  650  12 
Western           
  Kampala*  705  7  628  11  620  9 
  Buwana**  -  -  700  na  700  na 
  Masaka*  720  8  560  14  -  - 
  Mbarara**  900  22  -  -  900  22 
  Kabale**  900  23  -  -  800  28 
  Kasese**  760  8  -  -  700  11 
  Fort Portal**  760  9  -  -  760  9 
Averages           
  (Ushs/kg)  777  12  639  11  704  15 
  (US$/bag)  21.81  0.34  17.94  0.30  19.79  0.41 
Source:  Author’s survey of traders. 
Notes:  Ushs = Uganda shilling;  1 Rand = Ushs 205;  DAP = diammonium phosphate; 
CAN = calcium ammonium nitrate;  * = commonly quoted price for a 50 kg bag; 
** = commonly quoted price for one kilogram;  - = fertilizer was not available at the time of 
the survey;  na = the information was not available, or that traders were unable or unwilling 
to provide the information. 
Bukedea is a small rural trading centre roughly 30 kilometres west of Mbale on 
the road to Kumi and Soroti. There is just one agricultural input trader in the 
town that sells these inputs along with various consumer essentials. Fertilizers 
and seeds are supplied to the trader on credit by an NGO working to develop 
an input stockist network in that part of the country. The NGO suggests retail 
prices and associated margins. The in-kind credit arrangement calls for 
repayment as stocks are sold. Sales of seeds are brisk. The opposite is true for 
fertilizers, despite the very small margin taken (5%). Fertilizer sales for 2000 
totalled just 200  kg (four 50  kg bags). The trader attributes this sluggish 
demand to lack of awareness of fertilizer use among farmers. Price likely also 
matters. DAP costs 16% less in nearby Mbale. The fertilizer supplied by the 
NGO was sourced in Kampala, where prices are higher than they are in Mbale. 
The trader is well aware of that differential, having recently begun to re-stock 
seed supplies from an Mbale-based wholesaler. But the trader is unwilling to 
invest in new, lower-priced supplies of fertilizer until her slow-moving high-
priced stock sourced in Kampala is sold. She is also unwilling to lower prices of 
held stocks and incur the associated loss. 




Iganga is an important regional township, roughly midway between Kampala 
and Mbale. The town serves a large and vibrant rural community and boasts 
two relatively large agricultural input supply shops—one of which sold over 4 
MT of fertilizer in 2001—and a number of one-person operations exist—one of 
which sold 800 kg of fertilizer in 2001. Fertilizer sourced in both Kampala and 
Mbale can be found in the town, with that from Kampala appearing to be 
more plentiful and thus more important in price determination. Gross retail 
margins for traders sourcing fertilizer from Mbale are roughly 10% higher 
than they are for traders sourcing from Kampala. But Kampala appears to be 
preferred as a source by more traders because of the greater range of fertilizer 
types available there. This is especially true for certain N-P-K combinations 
used on horticultural crops grown primarily as cash crops. 
 
The highest prices and margins were recorded in Kabale, a remote town in the 
hilly southwestern corner of the country, near the border with Rwanda. In 
addition to the district UNFA branch, several private traders operate in the 
town, principally from stalls located in the central market place. All fertilizer 
sold in the town is sourced in Kampala—i.e., including that sold by the UNFA 
branch. At the time of the survey, all the traders in the town (eight in total) 
were carrying the same fertilizers (DAP and Urea) and charging the same 
prices. Margins were also very similar. With sales of 1 MT in 2001, the UNFA 
district branch was by far the largest trader. The branch’s pricing scheme this 
appeared to be the basis for other traders’ prices and margins. All traders—
including the UNFA branch--identified sluggish demand as the primary 
problem with the fertilizer business, especially in comparison to the seed 
business, which they said was vigorous and rewarding. 
 
Table  3: Prices, margins, and transport costs for fertilizers and other 

















DAP (50 kg bag)  35,000  38,000  3,000  1,000  0.33 
Urea (50 kg bag)  35,000  38,000  3,000  1,000  0.33 
Longe 1 maize seed (5 kg bag)  4,250  5,750  1,500  100  0.07 
Cabbage seed (pkt)  1,450  1,800  350  30  0.09 
Bean seed (5 kg bag)  4,500  6,000  1,500  100  0.07 
Tetracycline (bottle)  2,200  3,000  800  14  0.02 
Source:  Author’s survey of traders. 
Notes:  Ushs = Uganda shilling; 1 Rand = Ushs 205. 
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A basic problem facing fertilizer traders across the country is that while 
fertilizer prices and margins are high, these prices and margins are low 
relative to unit costs of transporting fertilizer, especially relative to other 
important farm inputs. For instance, in the western Uganda town of Fort 
Portal, the ratios of transport costs to gross retail margins for DAP and Urea 
are five times those of popular seed varieties, and more than ten times that of 
a common veterinary input (Table 3). Were traded quantities of these 
fertilizers high, these relationships would not be so damaging. But traded 
quantities are low. 
 
Table  4:  Cost and price build-up for DAP from Nairobi, Kenya to 
Kapchorwa, Uganda 






Nairobi      
  Nairobi sales price  $265/mt  472  472 
Mbale          
  Transport to Mbale  Road transport @ $US 2.90 per 50 kg bag  103  575 
  Clearing charges at border  Agent commission Ushs 100,000/15 mt lorry  7  582 
  Unloading  Ushs 50/bag  1  583 
  Handling  Ushs 50/bag  1  584 
  Storage  15 mt for 2 weeks @ 18%  62  646 
  Overheads  (0.2*1,701,000)/175,000  2  648 
  Licences  (0.2*350,000)/175,000  0.4  648 
  Total costs  Nairobi price + marketing costs  648    
  Selling price  Actual selling price  670    
  Importer's net margin  Selling price - total costs  22    
 % mark-up of importer  Net margin*100/selling price  3.23    
Kapchorwa          
  Transport to Kapchorwa  Road transport @ Ushs 1000/ 50 kg bag  20  668 
  Unloading  Ushs 50/bag  1  669 
  Handling  Ushs 50/bag  1  670 
  Storage  10 bags for  @ 18%  7  677 
  Overheads  (0.2*70,000)/500  28  705 
  Licences  (0.2*20,000)/500  8  713 
  Total costs  Nairobi price + marketing costs  713   
  Selling price  Actual selling price  740   
  Trader's net margin  Selling price - total costs  27   
  % mark-up of trader  Net margin*100/selling price  3.60   
Source:  Author’s survey of traders. 
Notes:  Ushs = Uganda shilling; 1 Rand = Ushs 205. 
 
The figures in Table 3 thus illustrate the basic impediment to development of 
a wholesaling backbone in Uganda’s fertilizer market. Better roads would 
reduce transport costs and improve the ratios somewhat for all the items. But 
such reductions would not change the basic fact that fertilizer has a very high 
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transport cost relative to its sale value. That conclusion is further reinforced by 
the finding of small net margins to fertilizer trading at all levels of the market 
(Table 4 and 5). Ranging from 3 to 5%, these net margins are lower than are 
many of those in Kenya, which range between 1 and 9% (Wanzala, 2001). 
 
Table  5: Cost and price build-up for DAP from Nairobi, Kenya to Fort 
Portal, Uganda 






Nairobi          
Nairobi sales price  $265/mt  472  472 
Kampala          
Transport to Kampala  Road transport @ $US 3.50/50 kg bag  125  597 
Clearing charges at border  Agent commission Ushs 100,000/15 mt lorry  7  604 
Unloading Ushs  50/bag  1  605 
Handling Ushs  50/bag  1  606 
Storage  15 mt for 2 weeks @ 18%  62  668 
Overheads (0.2*1,701,000)/175,000  2  670 
Licences (0.2*350,000)/175,000  0.4  670 
Total costs  Nairobi price + marketing costs  670    
Selling price  Actual selling price  705    
Importer's net margin  Selling price - total costs  35    
% mark-up of importer  Net margin*100/selling price  4.92    
Fort Portal          
Transport to Fort Portal  Road transport @ Ushs 1000/50 kg bag  20  690 
Unloading Ushs  50/bag  1  691 
Handling Ushs  50/bag  1  692 
Storage  10 bags for  @ 18%  7  699 
Overheads (0.2*70,000)/500  28  727 
Licences (0.2*20,000)/500  8  735 
Total costs  Nairobi price + marketing costs  735    
Selling price  Actual selling price  760    
Trader's net margin  Selling price - total costs  25    
% mark-up of trader  Net margin*100/selling price  3.24    
Source:  Author’s survey of traders. 
Notes:  Ushs = Uganda shilling; 1 Rand = Ushs 205. 
 
4.  REDUCING PRICES AND INCREASING MARGINS 
 
What is the scope for reducing fertilizer prices to farmers? Preliminary 
answers are suggested by the results in Tables 4 and 5. Viewed in light of 
additional information obtained during fieldwork, the results in the tables 
identify different forms and organizational arrangements in transportation 
and direct importation of fertilizer as possible sources of costs reductions. 
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4.1 Road  transport 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show that at each level of the market, road transport costs 
account for between 50 and 60% of marketing costs. Fuel, maintenance, and 
depreciation charges dominate these costs. It is difficult to imagine significant 
reductions in such charges. The need to traverse Kenya’s Rift Valley is 
unavoidable. Road quality is improving in Uganda but not in Kenya. Interest 
rates are high on both countries. However, the survey revealed that improved 
management and coordination of transportation services can lead to 
meaningful reductions in fertilizer prices. For instance, the retail price of 
calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) in Masaka (a large town 120 kilometres 
west of Kampala) in early June was Ushs 560 per kg (Ushs 28,000 per 50 kg 
bag). This price was 11% lower than that in Kampala and only 8% higher than 
that in distant Mbale. The gross retail margin was also higher than were those 
in most other towns. This low price and attractive margin resulted from a 
Masaka-based maize trader’s having transported maize to Busia in Kenya. 
Finding cheap CAN on sale there, the trader back-loaded it to Masaka. Similar 
opportunities to reduce transport costs may exist elsewhere in the country. 
Improved market information (intelligence) is crucial to identification and 
exploitation of such opportunities. 
 
4.2 Rail  transport 
 
An obvious avenue through which to reduce fertilizer costs lies in greater use 
of rail transport. Traders indicate that a one-third reduction in transport costs 
between Nairobi and Kampala could emanate from this source. Such a 
reduction in transport costs would translate into a 7% (Ushs 42 per kg) 
reduction in the cost of delivering fertilizer to Kampala, doubling the 
associated net margin. 
 
But rail transport is unreliable and delay-prone. The costs associated with these 
delays are enormous. Consider DAP moved from Nairobi to Kampala (Table 5). 
The cost of capital tied up for the 3 to 4 weeks currently required to move this 
fertilizer between these two cities by rail would add 7% to total costs (i.e. Ushs 
46 per kg), wiping out profit margins. There are few indications of 
improvements in railway administration in either Kenya or Uganda. 
 
Improvements in railway administration would require cross-border 
cooperation and coordination between Kenya and Uganda. As the East 
African Community gathers momentum, such cooperation and coordination 
may become more likely than it appears to be at present. 
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4.3 Direct  imports 
 
Every interviewed importer identified direct importing of fertilizer into 
Uganda—i.e., rather than via Kenya—as an attractive and feasible option for 
reducing fertilizer prices. For DAP, data reported in Wanzala (2001) suggest 
potential savings of at least Ushs 65 per kg from circumvention of Kenya-
based handling and storage costs. This would mean 10% reductions in prices 
of DAP in both Kampala and Mbale. Assuming other costs were to remain the 
same, net margins in Kampala would be thrice as high; those in Mbale would 
be four times larger. 
 
The principal stumbling block to realization of such gains is the requirement 
by overseas suppliers that consignments be at least 300 MT in size. Such 
consignments cost more than $100,000 (close to Ushs 180 million), well 
beyond the reach of the typical Ugandan importer. Limited overdraft facilities, 
high interest rates on such overdrafts (18% and above), and a range of stiff 
service charges and commissions on foreign exchange transactions add 
between 3 and 5% to these costs. Only two firms indicated that they regularly 
imported fertilizer directly from overseas. Their ability to do so was clearly 
based on relationships with large exporters in Europe (a parent company in 
one case). With these relationships comes the availability of cheap credit from 
European sources, relatively long repayment periods for in-kind credit, and 
circumvention of high charges, commissions, and cash deposit requirements 
levied by local banks. Resulting savings are high. 
 
The highest hurdle facing newcomers to fertilizer importing appears to be the 
need to demonstrate the ability to cover up-front the full costs of a large 
consignment. To qualify for letters of credit, most Ugandan banks require 
importers to deposit into their accounts amounts equivalent to the costs of 
entire consignments. This effectively excludes all but one or two companies 
from the direct importing business. 
 
Recently, the Bank of Uganda provided an official guarantee that 
circumvented the deposit requirement and facilitated granting of a letter of 
credit by a private bank to a consortium of private grain traders. This made 
possible procurement and export of 40,000 MT of maize to southern Africa at 
a time when the domestic market was awash with the commodity and prices 
had hit rock bottom. A similar arrangement might permit direct importation 
of fertilizer and lead to associated reductions in prices and increases in 
margins. This would require a brand of organization and collective actions 
among fertilizer traders that is currently absent. A major challenge would be 
to convince the Ugandan government that a measure used to rescue the maize 
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market in a year of unusually low prices is sorely needed in the fertilizer 
market in all years. 
 
5. SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The basic message of this paper is that the prevailing system of fertilizer 
procurement and distribution in Uganda implies a market structure 
dominated by retail-level trade, high prices, and low net margins. The high 
transport cost of fertilizer relative to its price means that scale economies are 
largely captured in Kenya, or at the first stage of the marketing chain within 
Uganda. There are no inherent pressures toward development of the kind of 
wholesaling backbone that exists in Kenya. 
 
Governments in the region—including that in Uganda—are under pressure 
from international lending agencies to “let markets work.”  Most of these 
governments have taken that edict to mean that they should not do anything 
at all in markets. That interpretation is unfortunate because it ignores the fact 
that the default condition for many markets is failure. Potential efficiency-
enhancing markets far outnumber actual ones. Uganda’s fertilizer market 
clearly exists. But its most fundamental efficiency-enhancing component—a 
wholesaling backbone—remains in the domain of the potential. 
 
Is there scope for efficient intervention in the fertilizer market that would 
reduce prices to farmers and increase net margins to traders?  The results 
suggest that this scope lies in improved market information systems, 
improved rail services, and flexibility in application of rules governing 
financing of imports. 
 
Given the structure of Uganda’s fertilizer market, the impetus for changes that 
could lead to realization of this potential must come from private importers. 
But that raises a number of challenges. The data suggest few incentives for 
these large market participants to invest in market development. A crucial 
recognition is that the small-scale retail-oriented trade predominant in 
Uganda’s farm input sector reflects small-scale subsistence-oriented 
production patterns across the rural landscape. Such production systems 
imply low demand for improved inputs. Success in developing Uganda’s 
fertilizer market thus hinge to a large degree on success in spurring new 
demand for fertilizer among smallholders. 
 
Experience from Kenya suggests that a promising innovation lies in linking 
fertilizer packaged and distributed in small, affordable sizes (“mini-packs”) 
with dissemination of improved information on cultural practices, broadly 
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defined—e.g., planting in rows, spacing between rows, seeding rates, timing 
and rate of fertilizer application (Seward & Okello, 2000). Such an approach 
requires cooperation between local community organizations, NGOs, and 
fertilizer traders. It is likely to prove appropriate in Uganda since, like their 
Kenyan counterparts, Uganda’s smallholders are constrained by both poor 
access to credit and poor access to relevant and timely information. 
 
The Ugandan government also has a crucial role to play. Local communities, 
NGOS, and private traders are unlikely to invest in the improved market 
information systems, or in the improved functioning and coordination of rail 
services that the analysis suggests are central to significant cost and price 
reductions in fertilizer markets. Individual traders are unlikely to be able to 
convince conservative bankers to bend long-established rules. The Ugandan 
government should be preoccupied with such concerns; it should be able to 
convince private traders to organize themselves toward profitable collective 
outcomes; and it should be able to convince private financial institutions to 
make low-risk adjustments in standard procedures. The current analysis 
indicates that such investments are also required if potential reductions in 
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